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The space station program is based on a set of premises developed from mission requirements and the 
operational capabilities of the Space Shuttle. These premises will influence the human behavioral factors and 
conditions on board the space station. These premises include: launch in the STS Orbiter payload bay, 
orbital characteristics, power supply, microgravity environment, autonomy from the ground, crew make-up 
and organization, distributed command and control, safety, and logistics resupply, The most immediate 
design impacts o f  these premises will be upon the architectural organization and internal environment of the 
space station. 
INTRODUCTION 
The space station program rests upon a group of premises 
based upon mission requirements and the operational capa- 
bilities of the existing Space Transportation System (STS) 
Orbiter. These premises will influence profoundly the human 
behavioral factors conditions on the space station. The most 
immediate design impacts will affect the architectural organi- 
zation and internal environment of the space station. 
This article describes two sets of premises in the space 
station program. The first set, conceived by the Space Sta- 
tion Task Force (SSTF), affects all aspects of the program, 
including design, operations, and mission capabilities. The 
second set, engendered by the Space Station Concept Devel- 
opment Group (CDG), affects environmental design and 
human factors in particular. Each set of premises contributes 
to  structuring a situation in which the human-factors advo- 
cate is given a clear role and a formidable task. Both sets of 
premises were groundwork for the “Skunkworks” at NASA 
Johnson Space Center from May through July 1984 and are 
manifested throughout the Phase B Request for Proposals 
that was the product of the Skunkworks (Systems Engineer- 
ing and Integration Space Station Program Office: Space 
Station Reference Configuration Description, JSC-19989, 
NASA JSC, Houston, 1984). 
Some of these premises, particularly those established by 
the SSTF, are made explicitly as program guidelines. Others 
are more implicit, and while not necessarily appearing as 
guidelines, underlie more visible recommendations. Both 
explicit and implicit premises should be recognized as foun- 
dation stones upon which to  construct a development pro- 
gram and a system architecture. Human factors considera- 
tions must be equally a foundation stone of the space station 
program. 
Before it is possible to  advocate the human factors case, it 
is essential to evaluate the implications of these program 
premises. And this examination of program implications 
must be carried out before research objectives are selected 
and certainly before design recommendations are made. 
SPACE STATION TASK FORCE PREMISES 
The four basic premises of the space station program have 
been established by the Office of Space Station (Code S) at 
NASA Headquarters, under the leadership of Phillip 
Culbertson and John Hodge. These four premises pertain to  
launch, orbit, power supply, and microgravity. 
Launch in STS Orbiter Payload Bay 
All parts of the initial space station will be launched into 
orbit in the STS Orbiter payload bay. The dimensions of the 
“dynamic envelope” for cargo in the payload bay are 4.27 m 
in diameter and 18.3 m long. When the docking tunnel is 
installed, the allowable payload is reduced to approximately 
14.25 m in length and may be further constrained by  center 
of gravity considerations. However, length is not as critical a 
dimension as diameter. The interior clear diameter is esti- 
mated at 4.06 m. This interior dimension represents a pro- 
found constraint in a confined environment and is signifi- 
cantly smaller than Skylab, which had a clear interior 
diameter of 6.5 m (ref. 1). Although the space station will 
have multiple volumes in four or five modules, the 4.06 m 
clear interior diameter will impose similar constraints on each 
module, no matter how many modules there are. These 
dimensional and volumetric constraints lead to serious 
concern for human performance levels over extended periods 
of time. The relationship between spacecraft cabin volume 
and human performance has served as one of the earliest 
measures of habitability (Celentano, J .  T., Amorelli, D., and 
Freeman, G .  G . :  Establishing a Habitability Index for  Space 
Stations and Planetary Bases, NAA-593-0, Space and 
Information System Division, North American Aviation, 
Downey, CA, June 1963, p. 39). The concern for habitable 
volume increases with crew size and mission duration. 
Low Earth Orbit at Low Inclination 
The station will probably fly in low Earth orbit at an 
altitude of approximately 370 to  580 km, the operational 
upper range of the STS Orbiter. The station will probably be 
placed in a low-inclination orbit of approximately 28.5’. 
Orbital altitude and inclination are partially dictated by mis- 
sion and operational requirements, but they are also influ- 
enced by and have consequences for meteoroid, space debris, 
and radiation exposure. These potential hazards have signifi- 
cant meaning for crew safety (ref. 2). Radiation in particular 
presents a special case of a human-factors issue in crew 
safety, with long-term consequences for astronaut careers 
and human productivity on orbit. 
Solar Photovoltaic Power Supply 
The power supply for the Initial Operating Capability 
(IOC) station will be a solar-powered photovoltaic array, 
providing a goal of 75 kW bus power, with the specific con- 
ditioning to be determined. In addition to some possible 
orbital fluctuations in peak power supply, human-factors 
implications include the likelihood that installation of the 
solar arrays may be extravehicular activity (EVA) labor- 
intensive, and long-term maintenance might impose addi- 
tional demands on EVA time. However, the use of solar 
power rather than nuclear power appears to  avoid a larger 
range of potential human-factors problems, including system 
safety, radiation hazards, and shielding that would be asso- 
ciated with a nuclear reactor on a human-inhabited space 
station. 
Microgravity Environment 
The station will have a “zero gravity” or migrogravity 
environment. There will be no attempt to produce artificial 
gravity by rotating the space station, because no require- 
ments for artificial gravity have come forth from the aero- 
space or scientific user communities for this space station. In 
fact, the major attraction of the space station for scientific 
work and commercial materials-processing is microgravity. In 
terms of human-factors considerations for rnicrogravity, 
ongoing research will continue in the area of physiological 
effects (ref. 5), health and safety (ref. 6), human-machine 
interaction (Bond, Robert L.: The Methods and Importance 
of Man-Machine Engineering Evaluations in Zero-G, Skylab 
Experience Bulletin No. 26, JSC-09560, NASA JSC, Hous- 
ton,  1976), neutral body posture (ref. 5), work stations in 
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wieghtlessness (ref. 6), anthropometrics (ref. 7), and design 
guidelines (Griffen, Brand N.: Design Guide: The Influence 
of Zero-G and Acceleration on the Human Factors of Space- 
craft Design, JSC-14581, NASA JSC, 1978). Additional 
research may be required in personal restraints, exercise, 
locomotion, and spatial orientation. 
SPACE STATION CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
GROUP MODEL 
From May 1, 1983, to May 1, 1984, a Space Station Con- 
cept Development Group was chartered to meet at NASA 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. The head of the CDG was 
Luther Powell of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center in 
Huntsville, Alabama. People detailed from the various NASA 
centers met in small study groups to establish a CDG straw- 
man or baseline configuration. Within this baseline frame of 
reference were several premises that are critical to human- 
factors engineering for the space station, particularly the 
autonomy baseline, safety model, crew model, and command 
and control system. Many of these CDG premises were 
adopted into the Phase B Reference Configuration that 
subsequently was developed at the Skunkworks in Houston. 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is valuable to address 
these premises in their original form, before becoming 
enmeshed in specific design schematics. 
Autonomy From Ground 
In developing the Autonomy Baseline, the CDG focused 
principally on autonomy from the ground, specifically from 
Ground Control or Mission Control. It is important to dis- 
tinguish between NASA Mission Control and user or experi- 
menter control on the ground, which will ideally be able to  
uplink instructions and downlink data with a high degree of 
independence from Mission Control or other NASA monitor- 
ing functions. The key points of the Space Station Auton- 
omy Baseline are as follows (Hodge, John; Herman, Daniel; 
and Craig, Mark: Space Station Program Briefing a t  Ames 
Research Center, NASA SSTF, Washington, D.C., Feb. 24, 
1984, p. DSG-320): 
1. Ninety days in orbit without an STS orbiter revisit for 
resupply or rotation of crew. This baseline has implications 
for crew training and scheduling and for the organization of 
logistical support. The nominal tour of duty for the crew is 
implicitly set at 90 days. This nominal period of 90 days is 
based principally on logistical resupply criteria for volume 
and weight characteristics of a common module modified as 
a logistics module (ref. 9), and Shuttle launch and module 
ground-processing schedule considerations (Opresko, Greg; 
and Keenan, T.: Study No. 3: Operations and Logistics 
Philosophy, Space Station Concept Development Group 
Workshop Briefing Charts, Volume I ,  NASA SSTF, Washing- 
ton,D.C., Dec. 5-9, 1983). 
2. Twenty-one days of survival time in “safe-haven” 
mode, in the event of some accident or catastrophe that 
requires rescue by the Space Shuttle. This 21-day figure is 
based on an assumed 19-day turnaround time for putting the 
next Shuttle back into orbit to  carry out a rescue, with a 
margin of safety (ref. lo). 
3. Five days in orbit without routine ground support 
from mission control in the form of advice, information, or 
instructions. This baseline implies that the station will have 
on board an extensive database about station construction, 
operations, and maintenance. However, in the event that 
some vital information is not available on board, the capabil- 
ity will be in place to  uplink it rapidly. Ground control will 
provide “bellringer support ,” a continuously open channel 
that will acknowledge a call in 5 min and supply expert 
consultation within 4 hr (Holmes, William: Study Task 
No. 1 : Autonomy, Space Station Concept Development 
Group Workshop Briefing Charts, description of Ground 
Responsibilities, NASA SSTF, Washington, D.C., Dec. 5-9, 
1983). 
4. One day in orbit with no communication from the 
ground, including the uplink and downlink of data. This 
baseline implies a 24-hr data-storage capability on the space 
station. 
It is important to note that while points 1 and 2 of this 
Autonomy Baseline are derived from anticipated system 
operational constraints, points 3 and 4 represent goals to be 
achieved. One long-range goal of this Autonomy Baseline is 
to reduce the large staff at Mission Control to a small staff 
that will “provide manned routine-operations support on a 
noncontinuous basis ( 2  to 5 dayslweek, 8 hours/day).” This 
reduction in staff would hopefully lead to a reduction in 
overall program operating costs for a program that will be 
permanently in orbit. The Autonomy Baseline, if fully imple- 
mented, would free many NASA personnel to engage in 
activities more productive than simply maintaining the space 
station in orbit. 
However, this transfer of decision-making responsibility 
from the ground t o  orbit will yield a new set of human- 
factors issues. This decision-making and problem-solving role 
will change the role of the crews from the Skylab experience 
in far-reaching ways about which it is possible to  only specu- 
late. The increase in self-reliance will contribute to 




Crew Makeup and Organization 
The crew of this initial station is projected at six to eight 
people. The crew of the post-IOC growth station is projected 
to double the initial crew to the range of 12 to 16 people, 
perhaps by the year 2000. There will probably be a fairly 
heterogeneous mix of backgrounds and talents among the 
space station crew. Typically, the crew might consist of two 
“classical” astronaut-pilots; two or three mission specialists; 
and three or four payload specialists from the scientific, 
international, or commercial communities. 
The space station crews would train together for a period 
of time to be determined before commencing their nominal 
90-day tour of duty on the space station. As a corollary to  
the Autonomy Baseline, part of the training for the space 
station crews may include working as mission ground con- 
trollers for other crews, not unlike the current practice of 
astronauts working as communicators in the STS mission 
control (ref. 11). However, payload specialists would prob- 
ably receive much more limited training than other crew 
members, which will contribute to the heterogeneity of the 
crew makeup in possibly unforeseen ways. 
One major variable in crew training and crew scheduling 
is the strategy to  be selected for the rotation of crew mem- 
bers through their tours of duty on the space station. An 
assumption has prevailed throughout the space human- 
factors community that a likely model for space station crew 
rotation would be that of submarine crews. The principal 
reason for this assumption is the belief that full blue-gold 
crew rotation would lead to better crew cohesion and team- 
work. However, a broadranging literature search of small 
group research turned up nothing definitive to  show the 
value or validity of extending the blue-gold system beyond 
the relatively unique context of a submarine. On a sub- 
marine, the isolation from the outside world is far more 
extreme than would be the isolation on the space station, 
where regular, protected communications with family and 
friends would be encouraged. If the rotation strategy fol- 
lows the “blue and gold” team approach of submarine crews, 
the entire crew will be exchanged at one time with an overlap 
period for turning over the station of approximately 4 to  
5 days which is comparable to  the turnover time for nuclear 
submarine crews (Essex Corporation presentation to the 
CDG at NASA HQ, Oct. 26,  1983. Background based on 
discussion following the Essex presentation). In submarines, 
the turnover occurs at dockside, with one if not both of the 
crews living on land, while both gold and blue crew members 
review their equipment and responsibilities together in the 
process of one crew handing over the job to the other. 
But the space station is not a submarine. There is no 
“dockside.” On the space station, the only other place to 
house the second crew during changeover will be the orbiter. 
But with a crew of eight for the space station plus two 
orbiter crew members, living for a week on the orbiter with 
10 people will be an exercise in severe residential crowding. 
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Also, this load would probably approach the limits of the 
current orbiter’s life support and other systems, indicating 
some possible modifications to  the orbiter itself. 
The first alternative is to house both full crews on the 
space station itself for 5 days. This approach could impose 
excessive loads on the station life support system, or require 
that it be oversized for a double load for approximately 5% 
to 10% of each crew rotation cycle. Actually, there may be 
no alternative to  sizing the life support system t o  the 5% of 
the time/double load because of the need to  hand over equip- 
ment and work responsibilities with both crews on board, 
and also t o  be able to  support both crews in the event of 
some emergency. 
The second alternative is partial crew rotation, where half 
of each crew of eight would be changed out at roughly 
45-day intervals. This alternative strategy, while reducing the 
crowding problem on board either the orbiter or the station, 
introduces two new difficulties. First, it will break up the 
unity of whole-crew training and will possibly introduce an 
element of “old-timer versus greenhorn” or “us versus them” 
syndrome between the two crew factions. Second, this alter- 
native will require a variation in the autonomy baseline for 
the 90-day independence from Shuttle revisit, and will put 
the crew rotation partially out of phase with the proposed 
logistical resupply strategy. However, it must be recognized 
that on the growth station with a possible crew of 16, or on 
larger space stations to follow, it is unlikely that it will be 
practical to change out an entire crew for every tour of duty. 
Therefore, despite some of its programmatic difficulties, this 
second alternative of partial crew rotation may prove to be 
the most realistic one over the long term. The research impli- 
cation that flows from this alternative is that it will be neces- 
sary to find crew training, management, and operational 
measures t o  mitigate the potential adverse effects of split- 
crew rotation. 
The crew selection, training, teaming, rotation, and sched- 
uling strategies will be influenced by mission and operational 
requirements which are just beginning to crystalize, so it is 
premature to speculate further about these crew issues. 
However, it is essential to recognize the significance of 
these space station crews being more diverse and creating a 
more complex microsociety in a more complex environment 
than any previous spacecraft. 
Distributed Command and Control 
One of the more radical ideas to  come out of the CDG 
was that the command and control system be entirely dis- 
tributed to  every habitable, permanent module on the space 
station. Unlike virtually all previous space station proposals, 
this concept contains no  centralized command module. 
There will be nobody in the role of Captain Kirk sitting on 
the bridge of the starship Enterprise eight hours a day with a 
staff of subordinates monitoring all the vital functions of the 
spacecraft. In fact there will be no bridge at all, Instead, in 
every module, there will be a basic command, control, and 
communications console from which all the vital functions of 
the space station can be monitored and controlled. And the 
station commander, if there is such a position, will be free to  
move about the station and perform other tasks, never being 
more than perhaps 20 ft from a command and control 
console. 
The station itself will be highly automated so as not to  
require constant human monitoring. While the CDG did not 
go so far as to  explicitly recommend distributed command 
and control, the space station crew responsibilities for 
automation/human-machine interaction present a logic that 
leads to  decentralized command and control. The key points 
of these functional requirements for both the station and 
ground control are as follows: 
1. Maintain station in operational status. 
2. Monitor station status and implement station 
3. Take any actions necessary for station safety or station 
configuration, 
integrity. 
Functional requirements specifically allocated to  machines 
include these automated functions: 
1. Perform “overhead” activities. 
2.  Perform repetitive, boring, dynamic, or dangerous 
tasks. 
3. Provide atuomatic fault detection, isolation, recovery, 
and/or corrective actions, including switch-over t o  redundant 
units. 
4. Provide for crew override of critical functions. 
Functional requirements specifically allocated t o  the crew 
are as follows: 
1. Overall supervisory control. 
2 .  Perform interesting tasks. 
3. Handle contingencies. 
4. Supervise machines. 
5 .  Conduct on-board experiments. 
6. Make immediate judgments, evaluations, adjustments, 
7. Make immediate modifications and repairs. 
and corrections. 
With the exception of periodically scheduled system checks, 
the station ideally will fly itself. Unplanned human interven- 
tion will be required only when an alert or alarm is annunci- 
ated on the system. When an alert in the form of a buzzer, 
light, or voice alarm does occur, the crew must be able t o  
respond in conformance to the immediate requirements 
previously described. In a contingency situation requiring 
immediate response, the crew must be able t o  turn to  a 
command console no matter where they are. Therefore, 
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every module must have a command console. Whether this 
console should be dedicated to perform command and 
control functions exclusively, or whether it should be con- 
figurable with video display terminals that can serve a variety 
of functions is a systems design decision that cannot be made 
as yet. A set of critical research implications flows from this 
level of automation: how to design a human-matched com- 
mand and warning system, how to maintain vital skills that 
will not be called upon except in a contingency situation, 
and how t o  conduct on-board training to  pass on the com- 
mand and control responsibilities to  the following crew. 
In addition to  these distributed command consoles, the 
IOC station will have one or two proximity-operations 
(prox-op) work stations which will probably be located in an 
observation station or cab. These prox-op stations will be 
used for rendezvous, docking, berthing, EVA and teleoper- 
ator monitoring, and other functions that may require direct 
visual observation. These prox-op stations should be distin- 
guished from the command and control consoles, although in 
those modules having prox-op stations, they may be asso- 
ciated by adjacency with the command and control consoles. 
This concept of distributed command and control suggests 
profound implications for crew organization and for the 
space station architecture. A discussion of crew decision- 
making process and management is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the space station architecture must consider the 
command and control system, including crew implications. 
The primary implication of distributed command and control 
for space station architecture is that all the other critical 
systems likewise should be decentralized or distributed. 
These systems include life support, electrical power, thermal 
control and cooling, communications, and a host of others. 
These subsystems are all architectural elements that shape 
the habitable environment, which will interact with the crew 
organization and the command and control system. 
Single Perceived Level of Safety 
Distributed command and control will have enormous 
implications for space station crew safety. Just as the vital 
utilities are distributed to every module, so can emergency 
provisions be decentralized as “safe havens” to each module 
(ref. 10). Each safe haven will contain all the necessary sup- 
plies to support the entire space station crew of eight for the 
period of 21 days indicated in the Autonomy Baseline until a 
return and rescue by  the Space Shuttle is possible. The safe 
haven will contain food, water, clothing, life support, and 
emergency waste management, and will be located in each 
module in a standard safe-haven pack that will be part of the 
common module. 
The strategy of highly decentralized and distributed safety 
preparations led to the logic of a single perceived level of 
safety on  the space station (meeting with Luther Powell at 
CDG offices, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1983). This logic 
means that each module will be designed to  be equally as safe 
or secure as every other module. And just as no work station 
in any specific location will be considered more essential or 
safer than any other (at least among the command and con- 
trol consoles) neither will any crew member be considered 
more or less essential than any other. The implication for 
crew teaming and training is that there will be no nonessen- 
tial personnel on board the station for the standard 90-day 
tour of duty. There may be some exceptions to  this ethical/ 
safety precept for people visiting the station for short periods 
of time, as in a brief Shuttle rendezvous. 
It is important to  point out that the safety strategy devel- 
oped by each of three groups, the CDG, the Phase B Skunk- 
works, and the Space Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study 
by the Rockwell International Crew Systems Safety Group 
(ref. 12), are somewhat at variance with each other. These 
differences will give rise to  some healthy dialogue about crew 
safety strategies. 
It is also important to  note that each crew safety strategy 
is predicated on various and differing assumptions about 
space station configuration. These differences become most 
manifest in the emergency life support and safe-haven strate- 
gies. For example, in the Space Station CDG-1 configuration, 
with most of the modules having only one means of passage 
to and from the multiple-berthing adapter module, a com- 
plete safe-haven package would be mandatory in each 
module (fig. 1). 
In comparison, the Phase B Reference Configuration, 
which features a “racetrack” circulation-loop pattern, would 
tend to alleviate the need for a safe-haven capability in every 
module, with perhaps only as few as two complete safe 
havens required (fig. 2). The synthesis of the crew-safety 
aspects of these studies appears to  support a racetrack con- 
figuration in which there are two means of egress from every 
module. But perceived requirements for safe-haven provi- 
sions, even with the racetrack in place, vary between the 
three approaches. Even with the racetrack, it might be 
deemed advisable to provide a safe-haven capability to  every 
module. 
Logistics Resupply Strategy 
The logistics resupply strategy is one of the mediums 
through which the Autonomy Baseline will shape the archi- 
tecture of the space station. To the extent that logistics 
resupply is linked to  a specific module, it is described here as 
an example of how a given module type may be shaped by 
different definitions of its function. Basic resupply will be 
provided in a special logistics resupply module, based on the 
common module, that will be brought up t o  the space station 
in the Shuttle payload bay, presumably at the same time as 
crew changeout. Thus each crew will start its tour of duty 
with its own 90-day supply of food, clothing, water, and 
other consumables. One of the most dramatic findings of 
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Figure 2 .- “Phase B” reference configuration module connection pattern. 
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the Logistics Study Group was that closure of the water loop 
on board the station as a primarily recycling system could 
reduce logistics launch loads by as much as 8200 kg/launch 
(ref. 8). Although the cost savings which might derive from 
closing the water loop at first seems obvious, when the actual 
cost of providing the recycling equipment on the space sta- 
tion is compared to  the actual cost delta of launching all the 
water in an already dedicated logistical Shuttle launch, the 
cost-benefit analysis may become more difficult. 
The degree to which it will be possible to  recycle water, 
launder clothing, or perform a whole range of renewable- 
capability functions will require considerable further study. 
The ultimate long-range goal of this avenue of research will 
be a bioregenerative life support system in which plants are 
used to  revitalize the atmosphere, process wastes, and to 
grow food for the crew. As the space station evolves both 
before and after IOC, ongoing trade studies will be per- 
formed between logistics resupply requirements and 
on-board renewable capabilities. 
This example of the logistics module and resupply strat- 
egy shows how the definition of this one module can affect a 
broad range of functions including safety considerations in 
the rest of the space station. I t  should not be surprising that 
logistics has such a far-reaching influence on potential space 
station design decisions; many habitats and settlements on 
Earth have been virtually created around “logistical supply” 
trade routes. In fact, an entire discipline of economic geog- 
raphy has developed to  study the role of the economics of 
supply and transport in relation to the growth of human 
settlements (ref. 13). Just as access to  the Great Lakes 
through the Erie Canal led to  the development of New York 
City as the primary port of entry, trading, and distribution 
center of the United States in the nineteenth century, so will 
the commerce in logistical resupply influence the growth of 
the space station. Logistical resupply and transit considera- 
tions will play an ever-increasing role for space station as 
humankind establishes permanent bases in geosynchronous 
orbit and on  the moon. 
Hygiene Facility Case Study 
This case study is a continuation of the previous example 
of the logistics module, taking the hygiene facility as a repre- 
sentative habitability function. The CDG model called for 
the personal-hygiene facility, including the waste- 
management system, to be contained in the logistics module. 
This location would facilitate the return of solid waste to 
Earth in the empty tanks on the logistics module, and also 
would provide the opportunity for regular cleaning of the 
facility, at the most probably point of origin for microbial 
contamination. This cleaning is difficult to  perform on the 
space station because all effective cleansing agents present 
potential toxic hazards to the life support system. Thus, 
cleaning the hygiene and waste-management facility using 
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current technology is quite difficult in orbit, especially in 
terms of maintaining it over a 20-year to 30-year space 
station lifetime. 
The proposal to  locate the hygiene facility in the logistics 
module presents both advantages and disadvantages. The 
principal advantages are the ability t o  clean it regularly and 
to refurbish it periodically. Also, having the hygiene facility 
in a module separate from the sleep quarters will help reduce 
noise problems. Noise problems must be viewed in the 
broader context of structural vibroacoustics of the entire 
space station. The principal disadvantages of placing the 
hygiene facility in the logistics module are a lack of conve- 
nience from the crew living quarters, and the possibility of 
complete separation of the hygiene facility from the space 
station during the change-out of the logistics module. If the 
berthing of the replacement logistics module was delayed for 
any reason, the crew could be forced t o  use a contingency 
hygiene and waste-management system, perhaps part of the 
safe-haven package. 
However, the Phase B Reference Configuration places two 
hygiene facilities on board the station itself, one in each of 
the habitation modules, with some auxiliary services in the 
laboratory modules. This approach of multiple, decentral- 
ized, personal-hygiene facilities appears t o  overcome the 
problems inherent in the earlier CDG Logistics module 
proposal. However, if the system operations require the 
return to  Earth of solid and liquid wastes, the requirements 
for pumping those wastes from the hygiene facilities into 
holding tanks in the logistics module will have significant 
impacts on plumbing throughout the station, particularly at 
the berthing-port interfaces, and the on-orbit cleaning prob- 
lem will demand a clear solution. 
In this respect, the hygiene-facility issue is representative 
of many functions for which decentralization or distribution 
present some operational and contingency advantages. How- 
ever, the penalty for this type of distribution of functions is 
a far more extensive and elaborate utility piping and cabling 
network, which will tend to  bottleneck at the berthing-port 
utility interfaces. The human-factors aspects of assembling, 
maintaining, repairing, and modifying these utility connec- 
tions have been virtually unexplored to  date, but they will 
have a profound effect on the long-term performance of the 
space station as a whole. Those few studies that do  exist 
posit remote actuated pin assemblies either within the pres- 
surized standard-berthing port (ref. 14), within a specially 
designed berthing port (ref. 15), or external t o  the pressur- 
ized volume, possibly carried on external truss structures 
(ref. 16). 
Preliminary investigations of human-factors aspects of 
module berthing and utilities conducted at NASA Ames 
Research Center have revealed a wide range of unexamined 
issues which are affected by space station configuration. In 
addition to  geometric, mechanism questions and possibilities 
with human-factors ramifications, utility connections arise as 
an early testing ground for decision making about which 
functions should be automated and which should be con- 
ducted by direct human involvement (ref. 17). An analysis of 
the human-factors and operational aspects of these questions 
should ultimately feed back into each architectural design 
criterion (ref. 18). 
To the extent that these examples of the hygiene facility 
and utility connections raises questions about automation 
and on-board crew construction and repair capability, it 
closes the loop back to the fundamental CDG premise of 
autonomy from the ground. The ability of the space station 
to maintain, renew, repair, and even expand itself will prob- 
ably be major tests of station autonomy. The human-factors 
implications of all these elements and issues are fertile 
ground for further research. 
Other Space Station Program Assumptions 
The Space Station Program as embodied in the Space 
Station Reference Configuration Description includes a num- 
ber of issues besides those evaluated above that will influence 
human factors on board the space station. The difficulty 
with these other questions is that they are too preliminary, 
involve too many unknowns, or are much too lively to 
permit a characterization as a program premise. Among these 
other issues are maintainability, operations, berthing, and 
mission requirements. All these topics will be subjected to 
extensive further scrutiny during the Space Station Phase B 
studies which will be conducted in 1985 through 1986. 
Summary 
The extent to which this set of premises shapes the entire 
space station program cannot be overemphasized. The vol- 
ume limitation posed by modules designed to fit the orbiter 
cargo bay will emerge as an overriding human-factors con- 
cern. The Autonomy Baseline affects the entire design 
process for every subsystem. The ideas drawn from the CDG 
studies may well shape particular systems and subsystems to 
a great extent. 
The key challenge for human-factors advocates is to recog- 
nize these assumptions and to understand the effects that 
they will have on the overall space station architecture and 
operations. The human-factors advocate must be able to 
argue his or her case to  the hardware engineer with full com- 
prehension of the complexities of the space station program, 
and to  explain the human-factors causes and effects of design 
decisions. This comprehension must rest on the ability to 
recognize genuine needs for research and the ability t o  imple- 
ment that research effectively. 
Ames Research Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
- Moffett Field, Calif., June 14,1985 
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